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1 Introduction
Microfinance has been regarded as one of the most promising means to alleviate poverty around
the world. Following the success of the Grameen bank founded by Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Muhammad Yunus, there are now at least 3,589 microfinance institutions (MFIs) serving more
than 190 million clients, 128 million of which are poorest (Reed, 2011). This means that
microfinance is now affecting the lives of one in some 37 people on earth. The questions
naturally arise: What made it possible for MFIs to expand their outreach to the poorest whom
traditional commercial banks had been unable to reach? What distinguish MFIs from other
commercial banks? Economists have been trying to answer these questions over the last two
decades (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; Banerjee and Duflo, 2010; Karlan and Morduch,
2010).
Among the distinctive features of microfinance, group lending was the first to attract the
attention of economic theorists, and has been at the center of theoretical research until recently
(Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghatak, 1999; Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Stiglitz, 1990; Varian,
1990).1 They argue that group lending raises repayment rates because, for example, it places
each client under repayment pressure from other group members and/or it excludes problematic
borrowers by letting borrowers, who have sufficient knowledge about their neighbors’ person-
ality and ability, voluntarily select other group members. Group lending, however, is not the
only feature that distinguishes microfinance from traditional commercial banks. More recently,
economists’ attention has been directed to other features, most notably to dynamic aspects of
microfinance (Fischer and Ghatak, 2011). They include sequential lending, where a few mem-
bers of each group receive a loan first and the others can borrow only if those who borrowed
successfully repay their loans (Roy Chowdhury, 2005, 2007); progressive lending, where loan
size increases as a borrower repays more loans (Egli, 2004); frequent repayment, where bor-
rowers are required to repay in small and frequent installments. The first aim of this paper
is to explain why frequent installment schedules are adopted by MFIs, which remain largely
unsettled theoretically.
In fact, frequent repayment schedules are quite common among MFIs; most of them require
weekly repayments beginning immediately after loan disbursement. Despite its prevalence,
frequent repayment has been a theoretical puzzle, because economic theory suggests that it
would increase default and delinquency by depriving borrowers of financial liquidity. To our
knowledge, there are two papers that attempt to provide a solution to this puzzle. One of them
is Jain and Mansuri (2003). They argue that frequent repayment schedules force borrowers to
borrow from informal lenders who have superior knowledge about borrowers, thereby enabling
MFIs to indirectly take advantage of their knowledge and deal with moral hazard problems.
1Theoretical results, which still await empirical scrutiny, tend to emphasize the importance of group lending
in alleviating asymmetric information problems. One of few and innovative empirical studies is Gine and Karlan
(2010), in which, using randomized trials in the Philippines, they find no change in default between group and
individual liability loan contracts.
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Another is Fischer and Ghatak (2010). They show that if a borrower is present-biased, frequent
repayment reduces the temptation to default by reducing the size of each installment payment,
and thus permits larger loans.2
This paper makes another attempt to solve the puzzle. It shows that the expected repayment
as well as the probability of full repayment under an equal installment contract, which is most
often observed in reality, are higher than those under a single repayment contract, even when
borrowers are rational and no informal lender exists. There are two reasons behind this result.
First, in the case of the equal installment contract, individuals who have borrowed and invested
in their projects usually pay earlier installments (before their project returns are realized) out
of existing income sources and/or savings. On the other hand, since repayment under the
single repayment contract is made at a later time, repayment rates under that contract are more
often affected by outcomes of borrowers’ projects. By offering the equal installment contract,
therefore, MFIs can ensure a certain amount of repayment before the repayment date for the
single repayment contract comes, making the effects on repayment of exogenous economic
shocks and/or outcomes of borrowers’ projects less serious. Second, the equal installment plan
reduces the amount of each repayment without much affecting borrowers’ incentive to raise
project returns. Thus, borrowers are more likely to be able to repay in full after project returns
are realized under the equal installment contract than under the single repayment contract.
Equal installment schedules, however, are often too much of a burden for the poor who
cannot afford to pay installments before their project returns are realized, which either deprives
them of credit access or forces them to borrow from other lenders and thereby pushes them
to multiple debts. In fact, to ease financial burden on poor borrowers, the Grameen Bank has
introduced a new system called the “Grameen Generalized System (GGS),” in which its staff
are allowed to offer a wider variety of repayment schedules as they gather experience and
information about borrowers:
“...size of weekly installments can be varied. A borrower can pay more each week
during peak business season, and pay less during lean period. In an extreme case,
each installment can be of different size.”
(http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=
30&Itemid=764)
For borrowers who face serious problems such as sickness, economic shocks, or natural dis-
aster, the Grameen Bank also offers a “flexible loan” in which the installment size is reduced
so that even those borrowers can afford to pay. However, the design of repayment schedules
is left to the discretion of each staff member. More generally, although it has been argued that
more flexible installment contracts will be able to improve borrowers’ repayment performance
2Empirical investigation into this feature has also begun, though still quite rare. For example, Field and Pande
(2008) find no significant difference in delinquency and default between a weekly and a monthly repayment
schedule. In contrast, Field et al. (2010) find that the introduction of a grace period raises both investment and
default.
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and welfare, how flexible each installment should be and in what way have not been analyzed
in theoretically rigorous terms. The second aim of this paper is to investigate how the amount
of each installment should vary under the flexible installment contract, which may depend on
factors such as the interest rate, the timing of installments, the probability with which an eco-
nomic shock or unexpected expenses arise, as well as the borrower’s performance under the
previous loan contract. It turns out that the proposed flexible installment contract benefits both
the borrower and the MFI; the borrower needs to pay a smaller amount of installments than
under the equal installment contract until her project return is realized, and the MFI can main-
tain a higher probability of full repayment than under the single repayment contract and, under
certain conditions, the equal installment contract.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Our setup is presented in Section
2. In Section 3, the single repayment contract is analyzed. The equal installment contract is
studied in Section 4. In Section 5, we propose and investigate the flexible installment contract.
Comparisons are also made with the single-repayment and equal-installment contracts. Section
6 concludes the paper and discusses possible extensions of our basic model.
2 The Model
We consider the situation in which an MFI offers a loan repeatedly to a risk-neutral borrower
provided the borrower has repayed all prior loans.3 The borrower has a source of income, from
which she receives a constant income w(> 0) at the end of each period.4 The borrower also
has a project requiring an investment of K(> 0), returns from which are realized two periods
after investment. Thus, if the borrower invests at the beginning of period 1, the project return
is realized at the end of period 2. The gross return from the project depends on the total time
spent on the project. If the borrower spends a1 hours in period 1 and a2 hours in period 2
on the project, the gross return is (a1 + a2)K.5 The function  satisfies (0) = 0, and is
assumed to be strictly increasing (0 > 0) and strictly concave (00 < 0) for all a1 + a2  0.
If the borrower works at hours on the project in period t (t = 1; 2; :::), her money-equivalent
disutility is  (at). The function  is normalized so that  (0) = 0, and is assumed to be strictly
increasing ( 0 > 0) and strictly convex ( 00 > 0) for all at  0. We suppose that the borrower
discounts future utilities at a constant rate (2 (0; 1)) per period and that she cannot save.6 The
3Wemake this assumption for analytical simplicity. Tedeschi (2006) shows that in her model, a limited number
of punishment periods are enough to discourage strategic default.
4As long as the individual can pay earlier installments under equal- and flexible- installment contracts, her
income need not necessarily be constant. Again, we make this assumption for simplicity.
5If we suppose that the borrower cannot make full repayment when her project fails, an introduction of a
probability  with which the project fails does not affect our major results.
6By “cannot save”, we mean that earnings cannot be set aside for one period or longer. Hence, the fixed
income and net project return, which become available at the end of a period, are used for needs that occur when
they become available or during the next period before the next earnings are realized. Armendariz and Morduch
(2005) and Karlan and Morduch (2010) point out that it is in fact difficult for the poor in developing countries to
save because of various saving constraints, including self-control problems and lack of quality savings products,
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borrower consumes a numeraire good. In addition, with probability p(2 (0; 1)), the borrower
faces unexpected expensesD(> 0) at the end of even periods, which are imposed by, say, house
repairs, medical emergencies, or economic shocks.7 Consumption in period 1 is financed by
initial wealth w0(> 0), which is exogenously given. Consumption in period t (t = 2; 3; :::) is
financed by the fixed income and, if any, the project return net of repayment and unexpected
expenses, all of which are realized at the end of the previous period. We assume w0 < K and
w < K so that the borrower can invest in her project only if she can borrow. The functions 
and  are time-invariant.
At the beginning of period 1, the MFI offers a two-period loan contract. The contract
is either single-repayment, (K;R), or frequent-installment fK; (T; d); B;Rg, where K is the
size of the loan as well as the borrower’s investment, R(> 1) a per-period gross interest rate,
T (2 [0; 2)) the time between loan disbursement and the first installment, d the amount of
the first installment, and B the amount of the final installment which is to be payed at the
end of the second period.8 Under the single repayment contract, the borrower is required to
repay R2K at the end of the second period. As for frequent installment contracts, we consider
two types of two-installment contracts; an equal installment contract and a flexible installment
contract. In the equal installment contract, the borrower repays the same amount at the end
of the first and the second period. In the flexible installment contract, the second installment
payment is required at the end of the second period, while the timing of the first installment
(T ) can be set freely. The amounts of the two installments can also be varied flexibly. In
order to compare the effects of different repayment schedules on the borrower’s behavior and
repayment performance, the values of K and R are set to be identical in all types of contracts.
As a first step toward a better understanding of flexible installment contracts, we consider the
case in which the MFI has sufficient knowledge necessary to devise flexible installment plans.
In particular, we suppose that, possibly through repeated transactions with the same borrower,
the MFI can correctly infer from the project return how long the borrower has worked on the
project. Alternatively, the MFI could gather such information from the borrower’s neighbors or
other group members, if any. Likewise, the MFI is assumed to know the borrower’s earnings,
the future discount rate, and the probability and amount of unexpected expenses. The welfare
of the borrower falls (at least weakly) if the MFI imposes a minimum time input on her. If
the resulting welfare decrease is large, the individual would rather not borrow from the MFI,
regardless of potential benefits for the both parties that would have arisen had the MFI not
imposed such restrictions. Thus, in this paper, we suppose that the MFI does not impose direct
restrictions on time input and let the borrower work as much as she wants. If the borrower has
fully repaid the loan, the MFI offers the next loan contract.
Given a loan contract offered by the MFI, the borrower decides whether or not to take it
among others.
7Unexpected expenses at the other timings do not affect the borrower’s repayment performance, though they
reduce consumption in the corresponding period.
8As we will see later (Eq. (17)), T , d and B satisfy a certain condition given R andK.
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and invest in her project at the beginning of period 1. Since the MFI is supposed to know the
borrower’s earnings, the borrower repays fully whenever possible. Otherwise, she repays all
her disposable earnings if any. When the borrower could fully repay her first loan, she decides
whether or not to take a new loan from the MFI. Otherwise, contracts will be terminated per-
manently and zero consumption results in the next period. In the flexible installment contract,
the borrower is assumed to know how the MFI will change the amounts of installments under
the next contract.
Let Ct and Ut respectively denote the borrower’s consumption and utility in period t(=
1; 2; 3; :::). Since the borrower is risk neutral, let Ut = Ct    (at). The borrower maximizes
her total expected discounted utility (TEDU). Thus, her maximization problem is given by
max E
 1X
t=1
t 1Ut
!
:
In the benchmark case of no borrowing, the individual cannot invest in her project by as-
sumption and thus her consumption in even periods is w. In period 1, the borrower consumes
the initial wealth, w0. In odd periods except period 1, the borrower’s consumption, which is
equal to her utility in this case, is w if unexpected expenses do not arise, which occurs with
probability 1  p,maxf0; w Dg if unexpected expenses arise, which occurs with probability
p. In our analysis, we restrict ourselves to unexpected expenses that cannot be covered by the
fixed income: w < D.9
Let v denote the TEDU from period 2 evaluated in period 2. If unexpected expenses do not
arise at the end of period 2, the individual can consume w in periods 2 and 3, and the TEDU
from period 4 evaluated in period 4 is v. On the other hand, if unexpected expenses arise at
the end of period 2, the individual consumes w in period 2 and nothing in period 3, and, again,
her TEDU from period 4 (evaluated in period 4) is v. By discounting future utilities by  per
period, v is expressed as:
v = (1  p)(w + w + 2v) + p(w + 0 + 2v):
By solving for v, we have
v =
[1 + (1  p)]w
1  2 :
In period 1, the borrower consumes the initial wealth w0. Therefore, the TEDU from period 1
in the benchmark case of no borrowing is given by
V (w0) = w0 + v
= w0 +
[1 + (1  p)]w
1  2 : (1)
9This could be interpreted that if unexpected expenses of such extent arise, the borrower may rely on her
relatives or friends to meet emergency needs but her consumption falls to (nearly) zero.
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From the above expression, it can be seen that V is increasing in initial wealth and its marginal
increase is one: V 0(w0) = 1(> 0). V (w0) given above is also expressed as
V (w0) = w0 + w + 
2[(1  p) V (w) + p V (0)]: (2)
3 The Single Repayment Contract
Let us first analyze the single repayment contract, (K;R). If the borrower agrees to the contract,
she receives and investsK at the beginning of period 1, decides how long to work on the project
in periods 1 and 2, and makes full, partial or no repayment at the end of period 2, depending on
her disposable earnings at that time. The order of decisions and events is summarized in Figure
1.
Suppose that the borrower devotes a1 hours to the project in period 1. Then she consumes
the initial wealth, w0, and incurs disutility from working for a1 hours,  (a1). Thus, the bor-
rower’s utility in period 1 is U1 = w0    (a1). Likewise, if the borrower spends a2 hours on
the project in period 2, her utility in that period is her income net of the disutility of working
on the project: U2 = w  (a2). The borrower’s consumption in period 3, which is equal to the
initial wealth at the beginning of period 3, is the sum of the fixed income and the project return
net of repayment and, if any, unexpected expenses, provided that the borrower could make full
repayment at the end of period 2. Otherwise, consumption in period 3 is zero. Formally, with
probability 1  p, consumption in period 3 is
maxf0; CH3 (a1; a2)g;
where
CH3 (a1; a2)(= w
H
2 (a1; a2)) = w + (a1 + a2)K  R2K; (3)
while with probability p
maxf0; CL3 (a1; a2)g;
where
CL3 (a1; a2)(= w
L
2 (a1; a2)) = w + (a1 + a2)K  R2K  D: (4)
wL2 and w
H
2 denote the initial wealth at the beginning of period 3 with and without unexpected
expenses, respectively.
As we will see in more detail below, how much the borrower works on her project depends
on how likely it is that she will be able to fully repay her loan; as it becomes more likely that
the borrower will be able to repay in full, she works longer (in total). Suppose that the borrower
works for ai1 hours in period 1 and a
i
2 hours in period 2 if she expects that she will be able to
repay fully only when unexpected expenses do not arise. Similarly, suppose that the borrower
works for aii1 hours in period 1 and a
ii
2 hours in period 2 if she expects that she will always be
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able to repay successfully regardless of unexpected expenses. Likewise, let aiii1 (respectively,
aiii2 ) denote the time input in period 1 (respectively, period 2) when the borrower expects that
she will never be able to repay in full whether or not unexpected expenses arise. Let us restrict
ourselves to situations wherein the borrower has rational expectations in the sense that her
decisions on time input based on her expectations concerning successful repayment give rise
to the expected outcomes. For example, if the borrower chooses the set of time inputs (aii1 ; a
ii
2 )
expecting that she will always be able to repay her loan successfully, she can actually repay her
loan fully regardless of unexpected expenses.
Throughout our analysis, we focus on cases wherein the following conditions are met:
Assumption 1: The borrower is (ex ante) better off borrowing from the MFI if she can fully
repay her loan at least when unexpected expenses do not arise.
Assumption 2: The borrower’s utility rises the more likely that she can successfully repay her
loan.
In such cases, the borrower chooses to work longer if there exists another rational expectation
that is associated with a higher probability of full repayment. Hence, the borrower chooses
the set of time inputs (ai1; a
i
2) if she expects that she will be able to repay successfully only
when unexpected expenses do not arise, which is correct if she chooses these levels of time
input, and if she cannot make full repayment when unexpected expenses arise even if she
works longer expecting that she will be able to repay in full regardless of unexpected expenses.
Analogously, the borrower chooses the set of time inputs (aiii1 ; a
iii
2 ) if the following conditions
are met: (a) she forms the self-fulfilling expectation that she will never be able to repay in full,
(b) she cannot repay fully even if unexpected expenses do not arise when she chooses (ai1; a
i
2)
expecting otherwise, and (c) she cannot repay successfully either with or without unexpected
expenses when she chooses (aii1 ; a
ii
2 ) expecting otherwise.
In sum, there are the following three possible cases:
Case (i): The borrower can make full repayment only if unexpected expenses do not arise
if she so expects. In addition, she cannot repay fully when unexpected expenses arise
even if she works longer expecting that she will always be able to repay in full. ()
wL2 (a
i
1; a
i
2) < 0  wH2 (ai1; ai2) and wL2 (aii1 ; aii2 ) < 0
Case (ii): The borrower can always make full repayment regardless of unexpected expenses if
she so expects. () wL2 (aii1 ; aii2 )  0
Case (iii): The borrower can never repay in full with or without unexpected expenses if she so
expects. In addition, no other rational expectations exist, i.e., either she can never make
full repayment even if she works longer expecting that she will be able to repay fully if
unexpected expenses do not occur, or there are cases in which she cannot repay in full
even if she works even longer expecting that she will always be able to repay successfully.
() wH2 (aiii1 ; aiii2 ) < 0, wH2 (ai1; ai2) < 0, and wL2 (aii1 ; aii2 ) < 0 or wH2 (aii1 ; aii2 ) < 0,
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where we consider strictly positive aj1 and a
j
2 (j = i; ii; iii).
10 In case (iii), the condition
wH2 (a
iii
1 ; a
iii
2 ) < 0 is redundant because w
H
2 (a
iii
1 ; a
iii
2 ) < w
H
2 (a
i
1; a
i
2) holds. Also, the condition
wH2 (a
ii
1 ; a
ii
2 ) < 0 is not needed, for the condition w
L
2 (a
ii
1 ; a
ii
2 ) < 0 alone prevents case (ii) from
occurring.
First, in case (iii), the borrower can never repay in full and thus her consumption in period
3 is zero for certain. Since she loses borrowing opportunities from period 3, the TEDU from
period 3 evaluated in period 3 is the TEDU in the benchmark case of no borrowing with zero
initial wealth, V (0). The utilities in the first two periods are the income net of disutility from
working. Hence, the TEDU in this case, V iii(w0), is of the form
V iii(w0) = (w0    (aiii1 )) + (w    (aiii2 )) + 2 V (0):
In the no-borrowing case, the present value of the first-period (respectively, the second-period)
utility is w0 (respectively, w), which is greater than the first (respectively, the second) term
in the right-hand side of the above expression. In addition, the initial wealth at the beginning
of period 3 in the no-borrowing case is w with probability 1   p, 0 with probability p (see
Eq. (2)), while that in case (iii) is zero for certain. Since V is increasing in initial wealth, we
can conclude that V iii(w0) given above is less than the utility without borrowing opportunities.
Therefore, unless the borrower can make full repayment at least when unexpected expenses
do not arise, she will not borrow from the MFI in the first place. In that sense, adverse selec-
tion is partially alleviated. The same applies to the equal-installment and flexible-installment
contracts.
Second, in case (i), the borrower can make full repayment only if unexpected expenses do
not arise. Thus, with probability 1  p, the borrower can successfully repay her loan at the end
of period 2, in which case the initial wealth at the beginning of period 3 is wH2 (a1; a2) if she has
worked for a1 and a2 hours in the first two periods. At the beginning of period 3, the borrower
is placed in the same situation as she was at the beginning of period 1. The only difference is
initial wealth. In contrast, if unexpected expenses arise, the borrower cannot make full repay-
ment at the end of period 2, ending up with the no-borrowing situation with zero initial wealth
at the beginning of period 3. In the first and the second period, the borrower consumes the
initial wealth and the fixed income, respectively, and incurs disutility from working. Therefore,
the value function in case (i) with initial wealth w0, V i(w0), satisfies:
V i(w0) = max (w0    (a1)) + (w    (a2)) + 2[(1  p)V i(wH2 (a1; a2)) + p V (0)]: (5)
Before solving for V i, let us turn to case (ii), wherein the borrower can always make full
repayment. In this case, the borrower’s initial wealth at the beginning of period 3 is wL2 (a1; a2)
with probability p, wH2 (a1; a2) with probability 1  p, which are both (at least weakly) positive.
10Conditions for interior optimums will be provided later (see footnotes 12, 15, and 16).
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In either event, the borrower can receive the next loan at the beginning of period 3. The value
function in case (ii) with initial wealth w0, V ii(w0), satisfies:
V ii(w0) = max (w0  (a1))+(w  (a2))+2[(1 p)V ii(wH2 (a1; a2))+pV ii(wL2 (a1; a2))]:
(6)
It is clear from (5) and (6) that both V i and V ii are increasing in initial wealth, and their
marginal increase is unity. Put differently, changes in the initial wealth do not affect the bor-
rower’s subsequent decisions. Since w0, w, , p, K, R, and D are all given, the Bellman
equations (5) and (6) respectively reduce to the following maximization problems:
maxa1;a2    (a1)   (a2) + 2(1  p)(a1 + a2)K (7)
maxa1;a2    (a1)   (a2) + 2(a1 + a2)K:
Since changes in the initial wealth at the beginning of any odd period do not affect the bor-
rower’s subsequent decisions, as long as loan contracts continue, the solutions to the above
maximization problem, aj1 and a
j
2 (j = i; ii), are optimal in any odd and even periods, respec-
tively.
In case (i), the borrower solves (7) by backward induction. First, given the time input
in period 1, a1, she maximizes the sum of the second and third terms. From the first-order
condition, the optimal a2 given a1, ai2(a1), satisfies:
11
 0(ai2(a1)) = (1  p)0(a1 + ai2(a1))K; (8)
assuming an interior solution (see Figure 2).12 This condition states that, given a1, the optimal
time spent on the project in period 2 equalizes the marginal increase in disutility in period 2
to the marginal increase in period-3 consumption (through an increase in the project return)
discounted by the discount rate and for uncertainty.13 As a1 increases, the marginal increase
in the project return with an increase in a2 falls, with the marginal increase in disutility with a
rise in a2 being unchanged. It follows that ai2(a1) is decreasing in a1: a
i
2
0
(a1) < 0. In addition,
differentiating (8) with respect to a1 yields
ai2
0
(a1) =   (1  p)
00(a1 + ai2(a1))K
(1  p)00(a1 + ai2(a1))K    00(ai2(a1))
;
which is greater than 1. Thus, total time spent on the project increases as the borrower devotes
more time in period 1:
d
da1
(a1 + a
i
2(a1)) = 1 + a
i
2
0
(a1) > 0: (9)
11The second-order condition is satisfied.
12Precisely, we assume  0(0) < (1  p)0(a1)K.
13It should be remembered that in case (i), all the earnings in period 2 are taken away if unexpected expenses
arise.
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Given ai2(a1), the borrower solves (7) with respect to a1:
maxa1    (a1)   (ai2(a1)) + 2(1  p)(a1 + ai2(a1))K:
The first-order condition combined with (8) gives:14
 0(a1) = 2(1  p)0(a1 + ai2(a1))K
=  0(ai2(a1)); (10)
assuming again an interior solution.15 The above condition ensures that the marginal increase
in disutility in period 1 with an increase in the time input in that period is just compensated
by the increase in period-3 consumption discounted by the discount rate and for uncertainty,
taking into account the effect on the period-2 time input of changes in the period-1 time input.
Conditions (8) and (10) characterize the optimal time inputs in periods 1 and 2 in case (i), ai1
and ai2  ai2(ai1).
Similarly, the optimal time inputs in case (ii), aii1 and a
ii
2  aii2 (aii1 ), are determined by:16
 0(aii2 (a1)) = 
0(a1 + aii2 (a1))K (11)
and
 0(a1) = 20(a1 + aii2 (a1))K
=  0(aii2 (a1)): (12)
By differentiating (11) with respect to a1, we have
 1 < aii2 0(a1) =  
00(a1 + aii2 (a1))K
00(a1 + aii2 (a1))K    00(aii2 (a1))
< 0:
Therefore, as in case (i), total time spent on the project increases as a1 rises:
d
da1
(a1 + a
ii
2 (a1)) = 1 + a
ii
2
0
(a1) > 0: (13)
Several findings can be obtained here. First, by comparing (8) and (11), the optimal a2
given a1 is greater in case (ii) than in case (i):
ai2(a1) < a
ii
2 (a1): (14)
14The second-order condition is satisfied.
15The required assumption is:  0(0) < 2(1  p)0(ai2(0))K =  0(ai2(0)).
16The second-order conditions for optimal a2 (given a1) and a1 are both satisfied. Conditions for the interior
solutions are  0(0) < 0(a1)K and  0(0) < 20(aii2 (0))K =  
0(aii2 (0)).
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This is because an increase in a2 raises consumption in period 3 (through an increase in the
project return) regardless of unexpected expenses in case (ii), while that is the case only when
unexpected expenses do not occur in case (i). On the other hand, an increase in a2 raises
disutility in period 2 for certain in either case. Therefore, given the same a1, the borrower
spends more time on the project in period 2 in case (ii) than in case (i). Second, from (10) and
(12), the borrower works longer on the project in period 2 than in period 1 in either case:
ai1 < a
i
2(a
i
1) and a
ii
1 < a
ii
2 (a
ii
1 ):
The above results hold because an increase in period-3 consumption (due to a rise in the project
return) is discounted less heavily in period 2 than in period 1. Third, comparing (10) and (12)
reveals that the time input in period 1 is higher in case (ii) than in case (i):
ai1 < a
ii
1 : (15)
The reason for this is similar to that for (14); an increase in a1 raises the borrower’s consumption
in period 3 for certain in case (ii), only when unexpected expenses do not arise in case (i).
Fourth, from (9), (14) and (15), the borrower works on the project longer in case (ii) than in
case (i):
ai1 + a
i
2(a
i
1) < a
ii
1 + a
i
2(a
ii
1 ) < a
ii
1 + a
ii
2 (a
ii
1 ): (16)
4 The Equal Installment Contract
In reality, most MFIs require equal installment repayment. In this section, we consider an equal
installment plan as a special case of frequent repayment schedules. As stated in Section 2, two-
installment contracts can be expressed as fK; (T; d); B;Rg, where T (< 2) is the time between
loan disbursement and the first installment payment, d(> 0) the amount of the first installment,
and B(> 0) the amount of the second and final installment, which is to be payed two periods
after loan disbursement. In order to compare frequent- and single- repayment schedules, the
loan size (K) and the interest rate (R) are kept identical to those in the case of single repayment.
T , d, and B satisfy the following equation(s):
R2 Td+B = R2K , B = R2K  R2 Td: (17)
From the above expression(s), it is obvious that the amount of repayment at the end of the
second period, B, is smaller than that under the single repayment contract, R2K, which is a
common feature of frequent repayment schedules.
In most cases, borrowers must pay in equal installments on a regular basis, which corre-
sponds to T = 1 and de = Be = R2K=(1 + R) in our setup. The borrower should manage
to pay the first installment from her disposable income at the end of the first period. We sup-
11
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pose that the individual can borrow from the MFI only when she can pay the first installment.
Variables associated with the equal installment contract will be denoted using~(tilde).
The utility in period 1 when the borrower works for a1 hours is ~U1 = w0    (a1), as in the
case of single repayment. In contrast, since the borrower should now pay the first installment
(de(= Be)) at the end of period 1, the utility in period 2 becomes ~U2 = w Be    (a2). If the
borrower can fully pay the final installment at the end of period 2, her consumption in period 3
is the sum of the fixed income and the project return, both of which become available at the end
of period 2, net of the final installment payment and, if any, unexpected expenses. Otherwise,
her consumption in period 3 is zero. More formally, period-3 consumption is
maxf0; ~CH3 (a1; a2)g
with probability 1  p,
maxf0; ~CL3 (a1; a2)g
with probability p, where
~CH3 (a1; a2)(= ~w
H
2 (a1; a2)) = w + (a1 + a2)K  Be
and
~CL3 (a1; a2)(= ~w
L
2 (a1; a2)) = w + (a1 + a2)K  Be  D:
~wL2 and ~w
H
2 respectively denote the initial wealth at the beginning of period 3 with and without
unexpected expenses. Since Be < R2K holds, ~wH2 (a1; a2) and ~w
L
2 (a1; a2) are greater than the
corresponding functions in the case of single repayment, (3) and (4), respectively:
wH2 (a1; a2) < ~w
H
2 (a1; a2) and w
L
2 (a1; a2) < ~w
L
2 (a1; a2): (18)
This means that if the borrower works the same number of hours, she is more likely to be
able to repay successfully under the equal installment contract than under the single repayment
contract.
As in the previous section, the following three cases could occur:
Case (i): The borrower can make full repayment only if unexpected expenses do not arise
if she so expects. In addition, she cannot repay fully when unexpected expenses arise
even if she works longer expecting otherwise. () ~wL2 (ai1; ai2) < 0  ~wH2 (ai1; ai2) and
~wL2 (a
ii
1 ; a
ii
2 ) < 0
Case (ii): The borrower can always make full repayment if she so expects. () ~wL2 (aii1 ; aii2 ) 
0
Case (iii): The borrower cannot repay in full regardless of unexpected expenses if she so
expects. In addition, no other rational expectations exist. () ~wH2 (ai1; ai2) < 0 and
12
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~wL2 (a
ii
1 ; a
ii
2 ) < 0,
where aj1 and a
j
2 (j = i; ii; iii) are the optimal time inputs in periods 1 and 2 in each case,
respectively. In case (iii), the borrower devotes some time to her project in periods 1 and 2
but can never repay in full, resulting in the no-borrowing situation with no initial wealth at the
beginning of period 3 for certain. Hence, the borrower would rather choose not to borrow from
the MFI in the first place. Since the timing and the amount of installment payments are fixed,
the borrower’s decisions on time input are unchanged from those under the single repayment
contract. In the other two cases, therefore, the borrower chooses exactly the same levels of time
input for the first two periods as those in the case of single repayment.
By the end of period 2, the borrower has already paid the first installment. In addition,
since the borrower chooses the same levels of a1 and a2 under the equal-installment and single-
repayment contracts, her total earnings available for repayment at the end of period 2 are also
the same. This means that the amount of total repayment is always higher in the case of equal
installments than in the case of single repayment. Moreover, since the amount of the required
repayment at the end of period 2 is smaller in the former case, if the borrower can fully repay
her loan under the single repayment contract, so can she under the equal installment contract,
but not vice versa. Therefore, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose that if the equal installment contract is offered, the borrower can pay
the first installment from her existing income source: Be  w. Then the expected repayment as
well as the probability of full repayment under the equal installment contract are higher than
those under the single repayment contract.
The above proposition indicates that there exist cases in which (a) the borrower can fully
repay her loan only when unexpected expenses do not occur under the single repayment con-
tract, while she can always do so under the equal installment contract, and (b) the borrower
cannot repay in full regardless of unexpected expenses with single repayment, while she can
repay successfully at least when unexpected expenses do not arise with equal installments. The
following corollary gives the precise conditions under which (a) and (b) occur:
Corollary 1. (a) Suppose that
R2K  w + (ai1 + ai2)K
and
Be +D  w + (aii1 + aii2 )K < R2K +D
hold. Then the borrower can repay in full only when unexpected expenses do not arise
under the single repayment contract, while she can always do so under the equal install-
ment contract.
(b) Suppose that
Be  w + (ai1 + ai2)K < R2K
13
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and
w + (aii1 + a
ii
2 )K < R
2K +D
hold. Then the borrower cannot repay in full whether or not unexpected expenses occur if
the single repayment contract is offered, while she can fully repay her loan at least when
unexpected expenses do not occur under the equal installment contract. If, in addition,
Be +D  w + (aii1 + aii2 )K
holds, the borrower can always repay her loan successfully under the equal installment
contract.
Proof. The borrower can fully repay her loan only when unexpected expenses do not arise
under the single repayment contract if she falls into case (i) of the corresponding contract, in
which case wL2 (a
i
1; a
i
2) < 0  wH2 (ai1; ai2) and wL2 (aii1 ; aii2 ) < 0 hold. The borrower can always
repay fully under the equal installment contract if she is in case (ii) of that contract, in which
case ~wL2 (a
ii
1 ; a
ii
2 )  0 holds. By rearranging these inequalities, we have the conditions stated in
(a). The conditions in part (b) can be obtained in an analogous way.
The above results indicate possible reasons why MFIs could lend to relatively poor bor-
rowers without requiring collateral. It should be remembered, however, that under the equal
installment contract, the borrower must be able to pay the first installment out of her existing
income source, which may be an impossible requirement for the very poor. Hence, it is worth
noting that borrowers whose fixed incomes fall below the amount of the first installment are
left out of consideration when analyzing the equal installment contract.
5 The Flexible Installment Contract
Let us next investigate a more flexible installment plan in which the MFI varies the amounts
of two installments more freely. Precisely, we suppose that the MFI offers a two-installment
contract, fK; (T; d); B;Rg, where the amount of the first installment, d, is not necessarily the
same as that of the final repayment, B. We allow the MFI to set the value of d based on how
long the borrower worked under the previous loan contract. Since d and B satisfy Eq. (17),
as the amount of the first installment increases, that of the final installment decreases, and vice
versa. In what follows, we mainly consider the case in which the first installment payment is
required during the first period, i.e., 0  T < 1. The other case 1  T < 2 can be analyzed
in a similar way, and so will be briefly referred to after the main case has been studied. The
final installment is due at the end of the second period. The timing of decisions and events is
summarized in Figure 3. Values associated with the flexible installment contract are denoted
using a “hat”.
14
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In period 1 (before the fixed income earned in that period becomes available), the borrower
is required to pay the first installment, d0, which is exogenously given. Since she must do so
using her initial wealth, w0, her consumption in period 1 is given by C^1 = w0   d0. Consump-
tion in period 2 is financed by the fixed income that the borrower earned in period 1, as is the
case under the single repayment contract: C^2 = w. The initial wealth at the beginning of pe-
riod 3, w^2, is the sum of the period-2 income and the project return net of the final installment
payment and, if any, unexpected expenses, provided the net sum is weakly positive. Other-
wise, the borrower cannot repay successfully and thus her wealth at the beginning of period 3
is zero. We suppose that the amount of the first installment under the subsequent contract is
set to be sufficiently small so that the borrower can pay it whenever she has successfully repaid
the current loan (d  w^2). It follows that consumption in period 3 is the initial wealth at the
beginning of period 3 subtracted by the first installment payment if the initial wealth is positive,
zero otherwise. To be more precise, period-3 consumption is
C^H3 (a1; a2) = maxf0; w^H2 (a1; a2)  d(a1 + a2)g
with probability 1  p,
C^L3 (a1; a2) = maxf0; w^L2 (a1; a2)  d(a1 + a2)g
with probability p, where
w^H2 (a1; a2) = w + (a1 + a2)K  B0
and
w^L2 (a1; a2) = w + (a1 + a2)K  B0  D; (19)
with B0 = R2K   R2 Td0. From B0 < R2K, w^H2 and w^L2 given above are greater than the
corresponding functions in the single repayment contract, (3) and (4), respectively:
wH2 (a1; a2) < w^
H
2 (a1; a2) and w
L
2 (a1; a2) < w^
L
2 (a1; a2):
Thus, given the same (a1; a2), it is more likely that the borrower can make full repayment under
the flexible installment contract than under the single repayment contract.
As in the previous sections, there are three possible cases:
Case (i): The borrower can make full repayment only if unexpected expenses do not arise if
she so expects. In addition, she cannot repay in full when unexpected expenses arise
even if she works longer expecting otherwise. () w^L2 (a^i1; a^i2) < 0  w^H2 (a^i1; a^i2) and
w^L2 (a^
ii
1 ; a^
ii
2 ) < 0
Case (ii): The borrower can always make full repayment if she so expects. () w^L2 (a^ii1 ; a^ii2 ) 
15
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0
Case (iii): The borrower cannot repay in full regardless of unexpected expenses if she so
expects. In addition, no other rational expectations exist. () w^H2 (a^i1; a^i2) < 0 and
w^L2 (a^
ii
1 ; a^
ii
2 ) < 0,
where a^j1 and a^
j
2 (j = i; ii; iii) are the optimal time inputs in periods 1 and 2 in each case,
respectively.17 As is the case under the single-repayment and equal-installment contracts, the
borrower will not borrow in case (iii), for the TEDU in this case is
V^ iii(w0) = (w0   d0    (a^iii1 )) + (w    (a^iii2 )) + 2 V (0);
which is less than that in the benchmark case with no borrowing (see Eq. (2)). Hence, we
consider only cases (i) and (ii) below.
Suppose that the borrower could successfully repay her first loan. Then at the beginning of
period 3, the amounts of the two installments under the new contract, which depend on the total
time input under the first contract, are already given for her. Hence, the borrower’s decisions on
time input from period 3 on are not affected by the time inputs in periods 1 and 2. On the other
hand, at the beginning of period 1, the borrower should decide how long to work in the first
two periods by taking into account not only disutility from working and the project return but
also the effect on the amounts of two installments under the next contract. This is because the
amount of the first installment under the next contract, which is due during period 3, affects her
period-3 consumption, and the amount of the final installment under the next contract, which
is due at the end of period 4, affects her period-5 consumption (provided the borrower can
fully repay the next loan). Therefore, by choosing the levels of time input in periods 1 and 2,
the borrower maximizes the sum of the expected discounted utilities in the first two periods,
the expected discounted consumption in periods 3 and 4, and the expected discounted gain in
period 5 from a reduction in the final installment payment under the next contract, which is due
to the first installment payment of the next contract. Thus, the borrower’s utility maximization
problem in case (i) is given by
maxa1;a2   (a1)  (a2)+2(1 p)((a1+a2)K d(a1+a2))+4(1 p)2R2 Td(a1+a2);
(20)
while that in case (ii) is
maxa1;a2    (a1)   (a2) + 2[(a1 + a2)K   d(a1 + a2)] + 4R2 Td(a1 + a2);
in which the constants are removed.
17For simplicity, we suppose that the borrower can make full repayment if and only if she can do so for the
exogenously given B0.
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Let us consider case (i) first. As in the the case of single repayment, the borrower maxi-
mizes the last three terms in the maximand given a1, and then solves the whole maximization
problem with respect to a1. The first-order condition for the optimal a2 given a1, a^i2(a1), is
 0(a^i2(a1)) = (1  p)0(a1 + a^i2(a1))K + (1  p)[2(1  p)R2 T   1]d0(a1 + a^i2(a1)); (21)
assuming an interior solution.18 The second-order condition is satisfied if
[2(1  p)R2 T   1]d00 < 0: (22)
Differentiating (21) with respect to a1 gives
da^i2(a1)
da1
=   (1  p)
00(a1 + a^i2(a1))K + (1  p)[2(1  p)R2 T   1]d00(a1 + a^i2(a1))
(1  p)00(a1 + a^i2(a1))K + (1  p)[2(1  p)R2 T   1]d00(a1 + a^i2(a1))   00(a^i2(a1))
;
which is negative but greater than  1 if (22) holds. Then the total time spent on the project
increases as a1 increases:
d
da1
[a1 + a^
i
2(a1)] = 1 + a^
i0
2 (a1) > 0:
Given a^i2(a1), the borrower solves the maximization problem (20) with respect to a1. From
the first-order condition and (21), the optimal a1 in case (i), a^i1, is determined by:
19
 0(a1) = 2(1  p)0(a1 + a^i2(a1))K + 2(1  p)[2(1  p)R2 T   1]d0(a1 + a^i2(a1))
=  0(a^i2(a1)): (23)
The optimum values of a1 and a2 in case (i), a^i1 and a^
i
2  a^i2(a^i1), are determined by (21) and
(23). Let us suppose that the MFI sets the timing and the amount of the first installment such
that
[2(1  p)R2 T   1]d0 > 0: (24)
The above inequality, the meaning of which will be explained later, plays a critical role in
motivating the borrower to work longer.
Likewise in case (ii), the optimal values, a^ii1 and a^
ii
2  a^ii2 (a^ii1 ), are characterized by:20
 0(a^ii2 (a1)) = 
0(a1 + a^ii2 (a1))K + (
2R2 T   1)d0(a1 + a^ii2 (a1)) (25)
18The required condition is:  0(0) < (1  p)0(a1)K + (1  p)[2(1  p)R2 T   1]d0(a1):
19The second-order condition is satisfied if (22) holds. The condition for an interior optimum is:  0(0) <
2(1  p)0(a^i2(0))K + 2(1  p)[2(1  p)R2 T   1]d0(a^i2(0)) =  0(a^i2(0)).
20The condition for an interior optimum is  0(0) < 0(a1)K + (2R2 T   1)d0(a1) for aii2 ,  0(0) <
20(a^ii2 (0))K + 
2(2R2 T   1)d0(a^ii2 (0)) =  0(a^ii2 (0)) for aii1 .
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and
 0(a1) = 20(a1 + a^ii2 (a1))K + 
2(2R2 T   1)d0(a1 + a^ii2 (a1))
=  0(a^ii2 (a1)): (26)
As in case (i), we suppose that the MFI changes the amount of the first installment so that the
following inequalities hold:
(2R2 T   1)d00 < 0 (27)
(2R2 T   1)d0 > 0: (28)
Differentiating (25) with respect to a1 yields
 1 < da^
ii
2 (a1)
da1
=   
00(a1 + a^ii2 (a1))K + (
2R2 T   1)d00(a1 + a^ii2 (a1))
00(a1 + a^ii2 (a1))K + (2R2 T   1)d00(a1 + a^ii2 (a1))   00(a^ii2 (a1))
< 0:
Thus, again, total time input increases as period-1 time input increases:
d
da1
[a1 + a^
ii
2 (a1)] = 1 + a^
ii0
2 (a1) > 0:
Let us briefly mention the case wherein the first installment payment is required during the
second period of each contract, 1  T < 2. The only difference from the case of 0  T < 1
is that consumption in the second period, rather than that in the first period, decreases by the
amount of the first installment. In this case, the function d should satisfy
[(1  p)R2 T   1]d00 < 0
and
[(1  p)R2 T   1]d0 > 0
in case (i) instead of (22) and (24), respectively,
(R2 T   1)d00 < 0
and
(R2 T   1)d0 > 0
in case (ii) instead of (27) and (28), respectively. The sings of d0 and d00 may or may not change
as theMFI changes the timing of the first installment payment from the first period to the second
one. If, for example, the borrower discounts the future so heavily that 2(1   p)R2 T < 1 <
(1   p)R2 T 0 hold with 0  T < 1 and 1  T 0 < 2 in case (i), the sign of d0 changes from
negative to positive as the MFI changes the timing of the first installment payment from the
first to the second period; i.e., the MFI should decrease (respectively, increase) the amount of
18
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the first installment as the borrower works longer if it requires the first installment payment
during the first (respectively, the second) period. Cases for other values of , R, T , and p can
be analyzed analogously.
We are now ready to compare the flexible installment contract with the other two types
of contracts. To begin with, let us compare the flexible installment contract with the single
repayment contract. First, from (8) and (21), the optimal level of a2 given a1 in case (i) of
the flexible installment contract, a^i2(a1), is greater than that in case (i) of the single repayment
contract, ai2(a1):
ai2(a1) < a^
i
2(a1): (29)
In both types of contracts, as the borrower works longer in period 2, disutility in that period
as well as the expected consumption in period 3 rise. In addition, in the flexible installment
contract, a marginal increase in period-2 time input changes the amount of the first installment
under the next contract by d0, which in turn changes the amount of the second installment under
the next contract. A unit increase in repayment during period 3 reduces consumption in that
period by one but raises period-5 consumption by R2 T through the reduction in the amount of
repayment at the end of period 4 (see Eq. (17)), provided the borrower can repay the second
loan fully. In case (i), the borrower can repay successfully with probability 1   p. Hence, the
expected discounted sum of the borrower’s gains from repaying one more unit of money during
period 3 evaluated in period 3 is 2(1   p)R2 T   1. If this is positive, the borrower is better
off paying more during period 3 as the first installment, and vice versa. The condition (24)
thus ensures that the borrower is better off working longer under the current contract. These
effects, which are absent in the single repayment contract, motivate the borrower to work longer
under the flexible installment contract. By comparing (11) and (25), we can see that given the
same period-1 time input, the borrower works longer in period 2 under the flexible installment
contract than under the single repayment contract in case (ii) too:
aii2 (a1) < a^
ii
2 (a1): (30)
Second, since (29) holds, comparing (10) and (23) shows that the borrower spends more
time on her project in period 1 in case (i) of the flexible installment contract than in case (i) of
the single repayment contract:
ai1 < a^
i
1:
From (9), (29) and the above inequality, the borrower devotes more time to her project under
the flexible installment contract when she falls into case (i) under both contracts:
ai1 + a
i
2(a
i
1) < a^
i
1 + a
i
2(a^
i
1) < a^
i
1 + a^
i
2(a^
i
1): (31)
Likewise in case (ii), (12) and (26) together with (30) show that the borrower works longer on
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her project in period 1 under the flexible installment contract:
aii1 < a^
ii
1 :
From (13), (30) and the above inequality, the borrower again devotes more time to her project
under the flexible installment contract than under the single repayment contract in case (ii):
aii1 + a
ii
2 (a
ii
1 ) < a^
ii
1 + a
ii
2 (a^
ii
1 ) < a^
ii
1 + a^
ii
2 (a^
ii
1 ): (32)
In short, in the flexible installment contract, if the timing and the amount of the first in-
stallment are set so that (22) and (24) hold in case (i), and (27) and (28) hold in case (ii),
the borrower’s expected discounted consumption increases as she spends a longer time on her
project not only through the increase in the project return under the current loan contract but
also through the change in the amounts of installment payments under the next contract and
the consequent rearrangement of future consumption in the borrower’s favor. In contrast, the
consumption-rearrangement effect is absent in the single repayment contract. Therefore, the
borrower works longer on her project with flexible installments than with a single repayment.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the borrower can fully repay her loan either (i) only when unexpected
expenses do not arise, or (ii) whether or not unexpected expenses arise. Suppose also that,
under the flexible installment contract, the MFI sets the timing and the amount of the first
installment under the next contract so that (22) and (24) hold in case (i), (27) and (28) hold in
case (ii). Then in either case, the borrower devotes more time to her project under the flexible
installment contract than under the single repayment contract.
From (4), (19) and (32), if the borrower can fully repay her loan regardless of unexpected
expenses under the single repayment contract, so can she under the flexible installment contract.
On the other hand, if the borrower cannot repay in full with unexpected expenses under the
single repayment contract, there are two possible cases; she still cannot make full repayment
under the flexible installment contract in bad times, or she can always repay in full under the
flexible installment contract regardless of unexpected expenses. Clearly, in the latter case, the
amount of repayment increases under the flexible installment contract. Also, in the former case,
from (4), (19) and (31) together with the fact that the borrower pays the first installment in the
case of flexible installments, the amount of repayment increases under the flexible installment
contract. Therefore, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Suppose that the assumptions stated in Lemma 1 hold. Then both the probability
of full repayment and the expected repayment are higher under the flexible installment contract
than under the single repayment contract.
In particular, the following corollary gives precise conditions under which the borrower’s
repayment performance is strictly better under the flexible installment contract:
20
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Corollary 2. (a) Suppose that
R2K  w + (ai1 + ai2)K
w + (aii1 + a
ii
2 )K < R
2K +D
and
B0 +D  w + (a^ii1 + a^ii2 )K
hold. Then the borrower can repay fully only when unexpected expenses do not arise
under the single repayment contract, while she can always do so under the flexible in-
stallment contract.
(b) Suppose that
w + (ai1 + a
i
2)K < R
2K
w + (aii1 + a
ii
2 )K < R
2K +D
and
B0  w + (a^i1 + a^i2)K
hold. Then the borrower cannot repay in full regardless of unexpected expenses (and thus
remains in the no-borrowing situation) if the single repayment contract is offered, while
she can fully repay her loan at least when unexpected expenses do not arise (and thus
will borrow) under the flexible installment contract. If, in addition,
B0 +D  w + (a^ii1 + a^ii2 )K
holds, the borrower can always repay her loan successfully under the flexible installment
contract.
Let us next compare the flexible installment contract with the equal installment contract.
Under the latter type of contract, the amount of final installment (Be) might be smaller than
that under the flexible installment contract (B0), which makes it easier for the borrower to pay.
On the other hand, the project return is higher under the flexible installment contract than under
the equal installment contract. Thus, in general, it is ambiguous whether or not the probability
of full repayment is higher under the flexible installment contract. If, however, the borrower’s
productivity is sufficiently high, harder work under the flexible installment contract improves
the borrower’s repayment performance. In such cases, under our assumption that the borrower
is better off the more likely that she will have credit access in the future, her welfare is higher
under the flexible installment contract:
Proposition 3. (a) Suppose that
Be  w + (ai1 + ai2)K
w + (aii1 + a
ii
2 )K < B
e +D
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and
B0 +D  w + (a^ii1 + a^ii2 )K
hold. Then the borrower can repay in full only when unexpected expenses do not arise
under the equal installment contract, while she can always do so under the flexible in-
stallment contract. Therefore, the flexible installment contract is better for both the MFI
and the borrower.
(b) Suppose that
w + (ai1 + a
i
2)K < B
e
w + (aii1 + a
ii
2 )K < B
e +D
and
B0  w + (a^i1 + a^i2)K
hold. Then the borrower cannot repay in full regardless of unexpected expenses if the
equal installment contract is offered, while she can fully repay her loan at least when
unexpected expenses do not occur under the flexible installment contract. If, in addition,
B0 +D  w + (a^ii1 + a^ii2 )K
holds, the borrower can always fully repay her loan under the flexible installment con-
tract, in which case flexible installments are better for both the MFI and the borrower.
So far, we have compared the flexible-installment and the equal-installment contract by
assuming that the borrower can pay the first installment of the latter contract out of her income.
Thus, poor borrowers who cannot afford to pay it were left out of consideration. If we focus
on those borrowers, as long as borrowing opportunities improve borrower welfare, the flexible
installment contract benefits the borrower under looser conditions:
Proposition 4. Suppose that either (a)B0+D  w+(a^ii1 + a^ii2 )K, or (b) w+(aii1 +aii2 )K <
B0 + D and B0  w + (a^i1 + a^i2)K, are satisfied. Suppose also that the borrower’s income
falls below the amount of the first installment in the equal installment contract: w < Be. Then,
the borrower’s (ex ante) welfare is higher when the flexible installment contract is offered than
when the equal installment contract is offered.
The conditions on the function d, namely, (22) and (24) for case (i), and (27) and (28)
for case (ii), are worth emphasizing. These conditions show that how the amount of the first
installment should be changed depends on the future discount rate of the borrower, , as well
as the interest rate, R. Let us consider case (i) for example. Suppose that the borrower should
decide how long to work under the first contract, i.e., during periods 1 and 2. Suppose also that,
given the probability of unexpected expenses (p), the borrower does not discount the future
much and/or the interest rate is sufficiently high so that 2(1   p)R2 T > 1 holds. Then, as
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we have already seen, an additional unit of repayment during period 3 under the next contract
reduces the amount of the final repayment at the end of period 4 by R2 T , which in turn raises
period-5 consumption by that amount with probability 1   p. Since the expected discounted
value of the consumption increase evaluated in period 3 is 2(1   p)R2 T , which is greater
than one, the more the borrower pays as the first installment during period 3, the more she
gains. Therefore, if the borrower does not discount future much and/or the interest rate is high,
the MFI can induce the borrower to work harder by raising the amount of the first installment
under the next contract as the borrower works longer under the current contract. In contrast, if
the borrower discounts future utilities heavily enough and/or the interest rate is low enough for
2(1  p)R2 T < 1 to hold, the MFI should decrease the amount of the first installment under
the next contract as the borrower works longer under the current contract. In this way, the MFI
can raise the borrower’s period-3 consumption. The amount of the final installment under the
next contract (which is due at the end of period 4) increases according to Eq. (17) and, as a
result, period-5 consumption falls. Still, as a heavy future discounter, the borrower is induced
to work longer during periods 1 and 2 because period-3 consumption is much more important
than period-5 consumption.
The timing of the first installment, T , is also important. The sooner the borrower pays
the first installment during the first period, the smaller the amount of the final repayment (see,
again, Eq. (17)). Suppose that the borrower should decide how long to work during periods
1 and 2 and that T is small enough for 2(1   p)R2 T > 1 to hold. Following the same
argument as above, an increase in the amount of repayment during period 3 (under the next
contract) reduces period-3 consumption but raises period-5 consumption. Since the latter effect
dominates the former, the expected discounted utility from consumption increases. Thus, the
borrower works longer under the current contract if she knows that the amount of the first
installment under the next contract will increase by doing so. The opposite result holds if T is
so large that 2(1  p)R2 T < 1 holds.
Analogously, the probability of unexpected expenses also matters in case (i). If it is highly
likely that the borrower will face unexpected expenses at the end of even periods, the probability
that the borrower will gain in period 5 due to a decrease in the amount of the final repayment
under the next contract (at the end of period 4) is quite low, because that happens only when
unexpected expenses do not arise at the end of period 4. In such cases, 2(1   p)R2 T < 1
is more likely to hold. Then the value of a unit of consumption during period 3 is higher than
the expected discounted value of the increase in period-5 consumption due to a unit increase
of repayment during period 3. Therefore, the MFI should decrease the amount of the first
installment under the next contract as the borrower devotes more time to her project under the
current contract. We obtain the opposite result if p is small.
Proposition 5. If (1) the borrower does not discount the future much, and/or (2) the interest
rate is sufficiently high, and/or (3) the first installment is required soon after loan disbursement,
and/or (4) unexpected expenses occur with low probability in case (i) (wherein the borrower
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can fully repay her loan only when unexpected expenses do not arise), then the MFI should
raise the amount of the first installment under the next contract as the borrower works longer
on her project under the current loan contract, and vice versa.
One of the major differences between the equal-installment and the flexible-installment
contract is that the amount of the first installment could be too much of a burden for the very
poor in the case of equal installment, whereas that can be flexibly chosen so that every borrower
who could successfully repay the previous loan can pay it in the case of flexible installment.
Indeed, Proposition 4 indicates that even if the borrower cannot pay a large amount for the first
installment out of her fixed income, she may still be able to repay her loan at the end of the loan
period out of her project return. At the same time, the MFI incurs risk if it waits for the whole
repayment until the end of the loan period, which is the case in the single repayment contract.
The proposed flexible installment contract ensures the MFI higher probability of full repayment
than single repayment and, under certain conditions, equal installment, without depriving the
very poor of loan access.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Most MFIs adopt equal installment schedules. Our analysis shows that the expected repayment
as well as the probability of full repayment are higher under the equal installment contract than
under the single repayment contract. This indicates that the equal installment contract enables
MFIs to lend to the poor who are unable to provide collateral. However, equal installment
schedules are oftentimes too much of a burden for the very poor, because earlier installments
should be paid out of existing income sources or savings, if any. We thus propose a more
flexible installment contract. Under this contract, the amount of earlier installments could be
sufficiently small so that every borrower who could successfully repay the previous loan can
pay them, which enables MFIs to expand their outreach further. In addition, the probability
of full repayment under the flexible installment contract is higher than that under the single
repayment contract and, under certain conditions, the equal instalment contract. This is because
in a dynamic situation wherein the MFI offers loans repeatedly to a borrower who has a long-
run project, the flexible installment plan gives the MFI a new device to induce the borrower
to make higher effort to raise her project returns. Hence, the borrower has higher disposable
earnings at the time of the final repayment and, therefore, she is more likely to successfully
repay her loans even when unexpected expenses arise. In the case of two installments, we
also derive the way in which the amount of the first installment should vary in the flexible
installment contract, which depends on factors such as the interest rate, the probability with
which unexpected expenses arise, and the future discount rate of the borrower. To be more
precise, if the borrower does not discount the future heavily, and/or the interest rate is high,
and/or unexpected expenses arise with low probability, then the MFI can induce the borrower
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to work longer on her project if it raises the amount of the first installment payment under the
next contract as the borrower works longer under the current contract, and vice versa. The
timing of the first installment also matters. As the time between the loan disbursement and the
first installment payment becomes longer by, say, an introduction of a grace period, it becomes
more likely that the MFI should decrease the amount of the first installment under the next
contract as the borrower puts more effort into her project under the current contract.
Our analysis merely serves as the first step toward the pursuit of more flexible and more de-
sirable loan contracts. In order to provide a benchmark, we assume that the MFI has sufficient
knowledge to devise the flexible installment contract. The next step should be to relax this as-
sumption and analyze cases in which the MFI lacks part of the information about the borrower
such as the amount of earnings or unexpected expenses. Second, it should be of interest to
incorporate savings into the setup by considering a risk averse borrower. Third, more sophis-
ticated installment plans may improve the probability of full repayment and borrower welfare
further. For example, how do the borrower’s decisions change if the MFI requires n installment
payments, dk (k = 1; :::; n), at Tk (0 < T1 < ::: < Tn < 2), respectively, allowing each dk
to depend on the information available on the previous contract(s) in different ways? Fourth,
the number of MFIs and/or borrowers could be increased. In fact, competition between MFIs
is found in many microfinance markets (Cull et al., 2009), which may affect borrowers’ repay-
ment behavior (Vogelgesang, 2003). We view these enrichments of our model as worthwhile
avenues for future research.
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Figure 1: Single Repayment
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Figure 2: Determination of Optimal a2 Given a1
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Figure 3: Frequent Repayment
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